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INTRODUCTION

Today, American labor is recognized as a part of the greatest
productive machine the world has ever known.

The present status of

labor, however, developed only within the past thirty years. In this
general survey of labor in hte 1930's the many barriers and obstacles
experienced in the growth of organized labor will be discussed.
In the history of the United States periods of great change have
emerged.

New conditions and attitudes take root and break long

established precedents. The political, economic and social instability of the 1930's made it possible for labor to assume a new status.
Labor's new position in the 1930's was due mainly to government
legislation condoning and protecting union activities. The New Deal' s
program for recovery from the depression was sympathetic to labor's
problems. Since the Democratic Party sponsored the New Deal many
laborers and labor leaders identified themselves with this political
party.

During the depression decade a cordial relationship existed

between labor and the Democratic Party. This can be seen by
reviewing campaign funds, elections, and campaign speeches of the
decade.

To understand labor's progress in the 1930's, a review of

the history of labor in the 19 2 0' s is necessary.

LABOR AND POLITICS IN THE 1930's

An appropriate epigraph for labor in the 1920's is: Its goals
and principles were drowned in a sea of prosperity and irresponsibility.

The prosperity of the 1920's, the aloofness of the American

Federation of Labor, the red scare, and the anti-union strength of
the employers made labor' s gains during the period insignificant.
Unemployment was not a serious problem until 1929.
During the prosperous twenties working conditions and long
hours were the notable complaints.

Unfair labor practices by

employers were most evident among the unorganized industrial
workers, such as steel and textile workers.

The skilled workers

represented by the A. F. L. fared well, caring little for their counterpart in the mass production industries. Prosperity overwhelmed
labor during this period.
luctant to organize.

Unions became less aggressive and re-

Union membership dropped from over five

million in 19 2 0 to a little over three million in 19 2 9 . 1 Relations
between industry and labor were definitely becoming more cordial.
This can be illustrated by the following list of strikes and lockouts

lArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. , The Crisis of the Old Order
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 19 5 7), pp. 111-112.
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during the 19 2 0 's as compiled by the U . S. Department of Labor:
1920 - 3,291
1921 - 2 ,381
1922 - 2,381

1923 - 1,553
1924 - 1,240
1925 - 1,300

1926 - 1,032
1927 734
1928 6292

Labor was involved in some political activity during the
1920's. Its most interesting affiliation was with La Follette's
Progressive Party during the election of 1924. Gompers and the
A.F.L. endorsed the Progressive Party. The endorsement of
La Follette is unusual since it was a tenet of Gompers not to
become dependent on any one party. 3 La Follette's Party received
support from the Railroad Brotherhoods. Support came from the
Brotherhoods due to a plank in La Follette 1 s platform advocating
the abolition of the injunction and government ownership of the
railroads. 4 The radical labor element, consisting primarily of
foreigners , also endorsed La Follette. 5 Even though labor did
endorse the La Follette-Wheeler ticket most laborers did not
give active support to the ticket. Local issues and alliances

2cal Lewis, "Labor Bewitched," The North American Review,
CCXLII (Autumn, 1936), p. 25.
3william English Walling, Labor's Attitude Toward A Third
Party, Current History, XXI (October, 1924), p. 40.
11

11

4Edward G. Lowry, La Follette' s Own Platform," World's
Work, XLVIII (September, 1924), p. 515.
11

5 stephen Frost, "La Follette's Mixed Army," Outlook,
CXXXVIII (October 29, 1924L p. 322.
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were more important to the rank and file and local leaders • Other
factors which indicate lack of labor unity was John L. Lewis'
support of President Coolidge / and George Berry's (head of the
Printing Pressman) support of the Democratic nominee, John W. Davis.
Labor's failure to deliver the vote was a factor in La Follette's defeat.
During the period of the 19 2 0 's A. F . L. membership declined
from 4,078,068 in 1920 to 2,865,978 in 1924. The United Mine
Workers had the greatest decline in membership in the early 1920's.
Coal was an ailing industry, failing to share in the country's
prosperity, because of competition from new sources of power.
Consequently, mine owners cut production costs by depriving
miners of a fair wage. Though the U. M. W. had the greatest loss
of membership, it still remained the largest union in the A. F. L.
Extensive use of the black-list and yellow-dog contract also
caused union membership to drop. 6 The only notable legislation
in labor's favor during the 1920's was the Railway Labor Act of
1926. This Act recognized the bargaining rights of the several
brotherhoods. It also forbade discrimination against unionists.
The Act set up a Board of Mediation to handle disputes and to act
as arbitrator. 7

6 Where Election Leaves Labor," Literary Digest, LXXXIII
(November 29, 1924)1- pp. 9-10.
11

?Herbert Harris, American Labor (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 193 8), p. 2 62.
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With the start of the depression labor along with the rest of
mankind lingered in misery. Markets dwindled, prosperity fled,
and there were legions of unemployed. During the days of
depression a change of attitude is seen in A.F.L. President,
William Green. Prior to the depression, Green received most of
his support in the A.F.L. from the United Mine Workers of which
he was a member. During the depression the U .M.W. lost many
of their members and much of their prominence in the A.F .L.
Consequently, Green began to court the favor of the craft unions. 8
The absence of an unemployment compensation plan added to
labor' s misery during the depression. President Hoover's principal
weapon against the depression was the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. The R. F. C. did not help labor directly because its
main function was to aid business and stabilize banking. 9
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics revealed some very
interesting information on unemployment plans operating in the
country during the early 1930 1 s. In 1931 there were seventynine unemployment benefit plans operating that affected
226,000 workers. There were fifteen company plans, sixteen
joint agreement plans between trade unions and employers, and

8Edward Levinson, Labor On The March (New York:
University Books, 1937), p. 7.
9schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order, p. 23 6.
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forty-eight trade union plans maintained solely by labor
organizations. In 1931 there were no compulsory insurance
plans in the United States. There were approximately thirtyfive million wage earners in America in 1931. The scarcity of
unemployment compensation plans is evident when the thirty-five
million wage earners are compared to the 2 2 6 , 0 0 0 covered by
unemployment plans . 10
Although the workers suffered, the A. F. L. 's attitude
towards unemployment insurance was negative. William Green,
at the 1931 A.F .L. Convention, denounced anything resembling
the dole. Green feared unions would lose some of their rights •
Green's fear was true to the Gompers' tradition of voluntarism .11
During the 1932 A.F .L. Convention at Cincinnati John L. Lewis
endorsed unemployment insurance. As might be expected the old
guard of the A. F. L. opposed the proposal. The old guard
believed any such plan would make the union too dependent on
government . 12
Prior to the New Deal, labor's greatest advance in the
1930's was the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. This Act outlawed

lOuunemployment Benefit Plans Now Operating in the United
States," Congressional Digest, X (August, 1931), p. 200
1111 0rganized Labor Spurns the Dole," Literary Digest,
CXI (October 31, 1931), p. 10.

12

Levinson, Labor On The March, p. 49 •
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the yellow-dog contract and restricted the use of federal anti-labor
injunctions. The use of injunctions had been outrageous. Here is
an example of how unreasonable the use of injunctions were:
An injunction issued in Iowa in 1930 enjoined the defendants from communicating verbally
or in written form or in any other manner, that there
was a strike at a certain mill or that there was a
controversy over wages, or that the complainant
was unfair to organized union labor. The injunction prohibited an employee from mentioning even
to his wife any of the said examples. If the employee spoke publicly of employer injustices, he
could be put in contempt of court .13
The 1932 Presidential campaign found Hoover defending his
business oriented programs and solemnly stating the country was
on the path to recovery. Roosevelt in his speeches emphasized
the need for direct relief and advocated unemployment insurance,
and he referred to the "forgotten man" many times.

However,

there was nothing in Roosevelt's immediate program for labor
except a promise to put people to work.

The A. F. L. was neutral

during the campaign except for the endorsement of friends of
labor among the Congressional candidates.

In summing up the

election of 1932, the only valid conclusion that can be made is
undoubtedly many laborers, disenchanted with the Hoover administration, voted for Roosevelt.

1311 Labor's Anti-Injunction Victory," Literary Digest,
CXII (March 2 6 , 19 3 2), p . 13 .
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After Roosevelt's inauguration the Black-Connery Bill was
labor's hope among the tons of legislation then being considered
by Congress. The bill's objective was to spread work by
establishing a thirty-hour week. Roosevelt opposed the bill,
because he was searching for a broadly based program which
would also include some provisions for business recovery. The
comprehensive plan that Roosevelt sought would eventually be
the National Industrial Recovery Act .14
The passage of the N.I.R.A. in June, 1933t gave labor
a definite boost. Certain sections of this Act gave labor
organizing rights , collect! ve bargaining rights, fixed minimum
wages / and maximum hours .15
Section 7a gave labor new life. Its main provisions read
as follows:
"Sec. 7 (a). Every code of fair competition,
agreement, and license approved, prescribed 1 or
issued under this title shall contain the following
conditions: (1) That employees shall have the
right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall
be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor, or their agents,
in the designation of such representatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities

14Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor In America (New York:
Thomas F. Crowell Company, 1960), pp. 263-266.
15Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Corning of the New
Deal {Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 99.
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for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection; (2) that no employee
shall and no one seeking employment shall be
required as a condition of employment to join
any company union or to refrain from joining,
organizing, or as sis ting a labor organization of
his own choosing; and (3) that employers shall
comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum
rates of pay / and other conditions of employment,
approved or prescribed by the President." 16
For the first time in the history of the nation a statute
passed by the Congress of the United States contained a
section according workers a legal right to organize and to be
protected in the exercise of that right.
Labor's reaction to the provisions of the NRA was most
favorable.

From Camden, New Jersey came the report that the

NRA helped raise wage rates in the pulp and paper industry,
furniture manufacturing, and automobile mechanics . Belleville ,
Illinois reported that NRA made it possible to organize the
garment, shoe, and restaurant industries. From Cedar Rapids,
Iowa came the report that the NRA had been instrumental in
getting a wage hike and shorter hours for the workers. 17

l 6william Green, 11 Labor' s Opportunity and Responsibility,
American Federationist, XL (July, 1933), pp. 692-694.
17 11 From Atlantic to Pacific," American Federationist,
XL! (January, 1934), pp. 88-91.
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Organization of labor and collective bargaining were
provisions employers did not concur with. Consequently, a
rash of strikes immediately broke out. The strikes developed
because labor wanted to enforce the rights granted through
Section 7a. There were strikes by the New York taxi
drivers and the shipyard mechanics in New Jersey and a
particularly violent longshoremen's strike in San Francisco
led by Harry Bridges. These strikes and many others occurred
because management did not obey Section 7a. In these strikes
there was much bloodshed and violence . Organized labor
encountered many obstacles during the existence of the N .I.R.A.
Employers utilized everything available to break union movements.
The use of tear gas, thugs / and espionage systems by employers
was not uncommon.
The U.S. Senate Education and Labor Committee (La Follette
Civil Liberties Committee 1936-1940) disclosed industry's use of
munitions such as tear gas, grenades, machine guns, revolvers,
and shot guns. Two thirds of the tear gas used by industry was
bought when unions were demanding recognition. Corporations
Auxiliary Company was a detective agency that served big
industries such as Chrysler, Firestone, Standard Oil, and thirteen
General Motors plants. Spies were sent in by the detective

11

agencies to gain important positions within the unions . 1 8 Company
unions were organized labor 1 s biggest barrier during this period.
Of the six hundred fifty-three companies with union plans in
November, 1933, sixty-one per cent were established after the
N .I.R.A.19
The main agency for interpreting provisions of Section 7a
was the National Labor Board. This Board made decisions upholding
majority rule in union elections. It also said employees should not
be coerced by employers in choosing representation. However /
this agency 1 s principles were not enforced. The National Association of Manufacturers advised its members to disregard Section 7a
until it had been established by proper judicial authority.
Judicial delay / however, was destroying labor' s rights. The
National Labor Board became extinct in the summer of 1934. It
was replaced by the first National Labor Relations Board. 2 0

l 8Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade (New York:
Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1947) , pp. 280-2 83.
1911 Union Movement Gains," Literary Digest, CXIX
(May 18 1 1935),p. 3.
2011 Goodbye Section 7a, 11 New Republic, LXXX(October 31,
1934, pp. 325-326.
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General Hugh Johnson 1 s and Donald Richberg 1 s decisions
on union -management codes were detrimental to labor. The
most famous decision was the merit clause interpretation. The
essence of it is as follows: employers could exercise their
rights to choose, keep, or promote employees on the basis of
merit without considering their membership in a union. Thus,
the union movement was rendered helpless. 21
Unfavorable interpretations, company unions, and
vigilante committees were not the only barriers hampering
organizing movements during this period. The arrogance and
disinterest of the A. F. L. also hurt organizing movements. In
March,. 19 3 4, the A. F. L. and the Automobile Chamber of
Commerce came to an agreement on new unions. This agreement
allowed for more than one bargaining agency in each plant.
Division of workers into various unions made it quite easy for
employers to promote their company plans at the expense of
organizing movements. 2 2
Although labor's status was declining as a result of
National Recovery Act decisions, it still retained a spark of

21 Levinson, Labor On The March, p. 5 8.
22Levinson, Labor On The March, p. 62.
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life. During a Labor Day speech at Chicago in 1934, Mayor
Fiorella La Guardia of New York prophesied that when American
labor got a stronger program nothing would stop its progress. 23
During the campaign of 1934, the Democrats capitalized
upon legislation it had given labor in the last two years. The
party promised the "forgotten man" more programs, especially a
social insurance plan. William Green and the A. F. L. gave
support to such a program. Henry P. Fletcher, chairman of the
Republican National Committee, accused the Democrats of using
relief and drought funds for political purposes. 2 4
In 1935 the N.R.A. was declared invalid. The Supreme
Court declared that Congress had unconstitutionally given legislative power to the President to draft the various codes. The
Court also stated in the Schechter decision that firms engaged in
intra-state commerce did not fall under the jurisdiction of the codes. 25
In evaluating labor's fate during the days of N .R.A. several
interesting conclusions come to light. Unemploy :rrent was reduced

2311 Left vs. Right Battle-Lines Forming in Nation," Literary

Digest, CXVIII (September 8, 1934), p. 6.
24 charles A. Beard, "The Politics of Our Depression,"
Current History, XLI (October, 1934), p. 6.
25 rrank Freidel, America In the Twentieth Century,
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960}, p. 334.
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by about two million during this period. Wages increased on the
average of five and one-half per cent. The wage increases were
offset, however, by increased living costs. Considering the
many pros and cons of the Act, labor as a whole gained.
Laborers who were unemployed were better off than those who were
unemployed prior to the Act. Even though labor's gains were marginal
in many instances, during the first two years of the New Deal, labor
undoubtedly lost much of the dread and despair previously
experienced . 2 6
The 1935 A.F .L. Convention at Atlantic City revealed the
organizing unrest that developed as a result of Section 7a.
Several days after the convention began {October 9, 1935), John L.
Lewis, Sidney Hillman, David Dubinsky, and Charles Howard led
their unions and six others away from the Federation and formed the
Committee for Industrial Organization. The primary cause for the
split was the A. F. L. 's failure to provide militant and sound
leadership to the mass production industries during the period when
industrial workers begged to be organized. Tradition overwhelmed
the A. F. L. in organizing procedure. The A. F. L. sought to organize
the mass-production industries along craft lines. This was illogical
since the mass-production worker was a composite mechanic and

26'

·Mauritz A. Hallgren, "Labor and the New Deal, "Current
History, XLII {September, 1935), pp. 563-567.
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would do the work of various crafts. When the Federation failed
to give unrestricted charters to new union groups its split became
a fact. 27
After the C. I. 0. seceded from the A. F. L"" labor in general
became more closely related to politics and the Democratic Party.
Since the N. I. R .A. and Guffey Act gave the C • I. 0 . leaders a
taste of power because of increased membership 1 their interest in
politics became more pronounced. In 1935 Roosevelt took a new
and different view of labor. Many workers were irritated with the
failure of the N .R.A. or national Run Around as it was now being
dubbed. William Green stated the whole labor movement would
oppose Roosevelt. Management was becoming more difficult to
deal with. With all of these elements stacked against Roosevelt,
he supported labor legislation in order to insure labor's loyalty
in the coming election. Also he needed to curtail more militant
and radical proposals beneficial to labor / such as the Townsend
Plan and Huey Long's movement.28
Friends of labor countered the militant groups with the
Wagner Act, which became law on July 5 / 19 3 5 • The National
Labor Relations Act was promoted by labor's Congressional

27 1evinson,, Labor On The March, pp. 21, 109.
2 8Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition
(New York: Vintage Books, Inc., 1959), pp. 33 6-337.
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friend, Senator Robert Wagner of New York. William Connery of
Massachusetts managed the Bill in the House of Representatives.
The Wagner Act was received with enthusiasm by William Green,
who hailed it as labor' s Magna Carta. The introduction of the
Wagner Act begins with a reference to management's irresponsibility during the period of the N . I . R .A. :
The denial by employers of employees'
right to organize and the refusal by employers
to accept the procedure of collective bargaining, led to strikes or other forms of industrial
strife or unrest, which have intent or the
necessary effect, of burdening or obstructing
commerce by impairing the efficiency, safety,
or operation of the instruments of commerce. 29
The Bill defined unfair labor practices on the part of employers,
such as interference, restraint, coercion, domination, and
discrimination in its relationship with employees. The Wagner
Act also established the National Labor Relations Board as the
official interpreter of union -management conflicts. The Board
possessed the authority to eliminate on the part of the employer
many unfair practices that had hampered union organization and
collective bargaining rights. Power to settle jurisdictional disputes between rival unions was also extended the N.L.R.B.30

2 9 Leo Wolman, "New National Labor Law," Review of
Reviews, XCI (September, 1935}i pp. 31-32.
3 OFlorence Peterson, American Labor Unions (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1945), p. 262.
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Employers were of the opinion that the Wagner Act would
die the same death as the N .R.A.

Even many laborers were

apprehensive at this stage. In 193 7 the validity of the Act
was upheld in the Supreme Court case, National Labor_Relations
Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation. This decision
marked a new trend in determining the scope of commerce power.
The decision stated that whether or not the processes of manufacture were themselves interstate commerce, labor disturbances
in the plant would re strain interstate commerce and were therefore
subject to regulation. This interpretation paved the way for
broader federal regulation. This interpretation had unprecedented
powers that granted many favorable decisions to the new union
movements . 31
The Liberty League led the employers in their response to
the Wagner Act. This group contended the company union was the
true protector of the individual. Majority representation deprived the
individual of these rights. A host of company lawyers prepared a
brief declaring the N. L .R .A. invalid. This group would provide
employers who ignored the N .L.R.B. with legal counsel. 32

3 lcarl Brent Swisher, Historic Decisions of the Supreme
Court (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958),
pp. 150-151.
3211 A Conspiracy by Lawyers, 11 Nation, CXLI (October 2, 1935L
p. 369.
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During the second New Deal a pro labor attitude in legislation is very evident. During the next few years many statutes
that were favorable to labor passed through the galleries of
Congress. In 1935 the Motor Carriers Act was passed. This Act
gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the right to regulate
maximum hours of service of employees responsible for safe
operation of passenger and freight motor vehicles. 33 The Social
Security Act passed in 1935 was another boost for labor. In
essence this Act would provide workers with unemployment cornpensation. This Act went on to state the following:
No one was to be denied payment of
unemployment insurance for the following reasons:
(a) Refusal to accept a job made
vacant by strike.
(b) Refusal of wages and working
conditions less favorable than
those existing in the immediate locality.
(c) Refusing to join a company union or
re sign from a bona fide labor union . 3 4
At last Labor Secretary Perkins' dream had come true. Most
state legislatures hedged on approval of the Act. State

33peterson, American Labor Unions, p. 262.
34"Eight States Rush to Pass Compensation Laws by New
Year," Literary Digest, CXXII (December 26, 1939), pp. 7-8.
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legislatures anticipated an invalidation of the law. The
constitutionality of the Act was upheld in three cases on
May 24, 1937. 35
Further benefits were extended to labor in the Public
Contracts Act (Walsh-Healy Act) of 1936. This Act stated
that employees working on United States Government contracts
amounting to $10 , 0 0 0 or more were to be paid the prevailing
wage in the industry. Also, the Act prohibited child and
convict labor. 36 Another piece of pro labor legislation passed
in 1936 was the Byrnes Act (Anti-Strike Breaking Act). The
Byrnes Act prohibited interstate transportation of anyone who
is employed to obstruct peaceful picketing of employees or
interfere with their right to organize and bargain collectively. 3 7
The abundance of pro labor legislation was to reap dividends for the Democratic Party in the 1936 elections. Labor
contributed generously to the Democratic campaign chest.
Labor's total contribution to the Democratic Party in 1936 was
$ 7 7 0, 218 . When compared to the A. F. L. political contributions

35"Social Security Act Declared Constitutional," Monthly
Labor Review, XLV {July, 1937), pp. 179-187.
3 6Harold W. Metz, Labor Policy of the Government
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1945), p. 15.
3 7Peterson, American Labor Unions, p . 2 49 .
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over the past thirty years which amounted to $95, OOO, labor' s
contributions loom quite large . 3 8 A further breakdown of union
contributions shows most of the money came from unions affiliated
with the C. I. 0. Following is a list of union contributions:
United Mine Workers of America
Amalgamated Clothing Workers
of America
International Ladies Garment
Workers Union
Cap and Millinery Union
International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees
& Motion Picture Operators
International Brotherhood
of Teamsters
Brewery Workers (Locals)
All other unions

$469,870
81,682
60,736
11,940

16,100
7,700
5,834
116,356

Of the $469,870 the U .M.W. contributed, $50,000 of it was a
loan to the Democratic National Committee. 39
William Green personally supported Roosevelt. The A. F. L.
did not endorse Roosevelt, although many of its affiliates did.
Big business reduced its contribution to the Democratic Party
from twenty-four per cent of the total campaign funds in 1932 to
four per cent of the total campaign funds in 1936. 4 o

38 Henry Pelling.t American Labor (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960), p. 166.

3 9 Louise Overacker 1 "Labor' s Political Contributions, 11
Political Science Quarterly, LIV (March, 1939), p. 59.
40 Ibid., p. 60.
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Governor Alfred Landon of Kansas, the 1936 Republican
presidential nominee, earned labor 1 s wrath early in the campaign.
A portion of Landon 1 s acceptance speech shows why labor
denounced him:
The right of labor to organize, means
to me, the right of employees to join any
type of union that they prefer, whether it
covers their plant, their craft, or their
industry. It means that / in the absence of
a union contract, an employee has an equal
right to join or refuse to join a union. 41
In this speech Landon condoned the open shop and consequently
lost union support.
Union support for Roosevelt was evident in a speech by
John L. Lewis.
Labor has gained more under President
Roosevelt than under any other President in
memory. Obviously it is the duty of labor
to support him one hundred per cent in the
next election. 42
In 1936 the Labor Non-Partisan League was established. The
purpose of the League was to nominate and elect those candidates
pledged to support labor. In the 1936 Presidential election the
League contributed $170, OOO to re-elect Roosevelt. The League
also supported the formation of the American Labor Party in New

41Lewis / "Labor Bewitched," pp. 9-10.
4 2 Dulles , Labor in America, p . 314 .
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York. Sidney Hillman and John L. Lewis of the C .I. 0. were
active leaders in the formation of the League. In fact, the
C. I. 0. advanced the League $5 00 / OOO. Green and the A. F. L.
accused the League of dualism in politics and would not support
it. The Non-Partisan League was officially headed by George L.
Berry of the Printing Pressman's Union.
The Liberty League was Roosevelt 1 s most pitter and
slanderous critic during the 1936 campaign. This group was
composed of lawyers, financiers / and business leaders. The
Liberty League charged Roosevelt with promoting foreign creeds
of regimentation, socialism, and fascism. The Liberty League
spent over $500,000 in the 1936 campaign in an attempt to defeat Roosevelt. This figure did not include funds collected and
spent by the state and local units of the Liberty League. 43
The American Labor Party, previously mentioned, was
known formerly as the New York State Labor League. The
American Labor Party nominated Roosevelt to gain the socialist
vote in New York. The socialists believed Roosevelt was leading
the class struggle against the economic royalists. 44

4 3George Soule, "Liberty League Liberty, New Republic
LXXXVIII (September 9, 193 6), pp. 121-122.
44George E. Sokolsky, "The Split in Labor," Atlantic
Monthly, CLVIII (October, 1936), p. 468.
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With vengeance Roosevelt's critics attacked him in the
1936 campaign.

Projects such as F.E.R.A., T.V.A., and W.P.A.

were viewed as vote acquiring schemes. The New Deal was
promoting a decay of American "individualism" and creating a
society of social parasites. In the last analysis Roosevelt's
opponents contended, "You cannot beat Santa Claus." 45
In all of Roosevelt's campaigns during the 1930's, the
Republicans spent more than the Democrats. The figures below
validate the above statement:

1932 election
19 3 6 election

Democrats

Republicans

$2,245,975
5 1 9 4 7 41

$2,900,000
8 /f 8 9 2 t 9 7 2 4 6

I

I

It is interesting to note that labor contributed over a fifth of
the Democrats total campaign funds in 1936. After the 1936
election the Lonergan Committee, a Senate Investigating
Committee, recommended the prohibition of contributions from
labor. This recommendation made no headway at this time. 47

45 Louise Overacker / Presidential Campaign Funds
(Boston: University Press, 1946), p. 18.
46 Ibid.

I

p. 3 2.

4 7 Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds, p. 5 5.
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The C .I.O. 'sties with President Roosevelt became strained
after the 193 6 election. The primary reason for the tension was a
feud between John L. Lewis and Roosevelt. Lewis' arrogance
became unbearable after the 193 6 election. Lewis attributed the
victory of the Democrats in 1936 to his vote producing ability.
He also inferred the New Deal and Roosevelt were now fully
obligated to C. I. 0. policies. Roosevelt very tactfully rebuked
Lewis' thesis. As a result of the President's rebuke, Lewis
began to nurse a grudge which would deepen in the ensuing dispute with the "Little Steel" companies.
In 19 3 7 the C . I. 0. made their first serious attempt to
organize the steel workers. The drive to organize the steel
workers was done through the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
under the leadership of Philip Murray. The large steel companies
such as United States Steel made an early agreement with S. W. 0. C.
Organization of several smaller companies gave S. W. 0 .C. its
biggest challenge. Republic Steel under the leadership of Tom
Girdler, violently resisted unionization.

Memorial Day, 193 7, saw

ten strikers die at the Republic Steel Plant in South Chicago. The
many exchanges between Lewis and Girdler so irritated Roosevelt
that he lashed out at both of them saying "a plague upon both your
houses. 1148

48Dulles, Labor in America, p. 320.
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As a result of this utterance, Lewis publicly denounced
Roosevelt. In his classic statement Lewis claimed:
It ill behooves one who has supped
at labor's table and who has been
sheltered in labor 1 s house, to curse with
equal fervor and fine impartiality both
labor and its adversaries when they
become locked in deadly embrace. 49
Lewis considered Roosevelt ungrateful for the support labor gave
him in the 1936 campaign. Lewis returned to the Republican
Party. Though Lewis left the Democratic Party most of the
C . I. 0. , leaders and members remained loyal to the party.
Roosevelt's attitude as exhibited in his utterance, "a plague
upon both your houses," was actually beneficial to labor.
After Roosevelt's outburst the government took a position of
aloofness. The government refused to use force in stopping
the many sit-down strikes. 5 0
The sit-down strikes were utilized by the C. I. 0. in gaining
recognition from General Motors, Chrysler, and Goodyear. Of
the 4, 7 40 strikes in 193 7, 477 were sit-downs. The sit-down
strikes were declared unconstitutional in March 1939. The sitdowns were declared illegal in their inception and prosecution.
The N. L .R. B. 1 s interpretation of the sit-down strikes was also

49 Ibid.

I

p. 321.

50 oexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt
1932-45 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 65.
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invalidated in this court decision. 51
In 1937 Roosevelt became increasingly troubled over the
split in labor. Grounds for Roosevelt's pessimism were evident on
the West Coast. Harry Bridges of the C .I.O. and David Beck of
the A. F. L. were bickering over jurisdictional rights in this area.
President Roosevelt, who was touring the West Coast, found indications that the A. F. L. might break away from the New Deal.

The

major complaints of the A. F . L. were that the regional offices of the
N .L.R.B. were biased and that the Wagner Act was operating for the
benefit of the C. I. 0. Roosevelt's concern over the internecine war
was justified politically.

The A. F. L. and C. I. 0. were the New

Deal' s principal supporters west of the Mississippi. 52
Labor's biggest boost from the New Deal in 1938 was the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
mum hours.

The Act established minimum wages and maxi-

It also provided for time and one-half rates for hours in

excess of forty per week. Another notable provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act Prohibited child labor in concerns producing for
interstate commerce. 53

5l"Sit-Down Setback," Newsweek, XIII (March 6, 1939),
pp. 47-48.
52Richard L. Newberger, "Roosevelt Rides Again," Current
History, XLVII (November, 1937), pp. 45-46.
53paul H. Douglas and Joseph Hackman, "The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938," Political Science Quarterly, LIV
(March, 1939), p. 29.
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The 1938 Congressional elections demonstrated labor 1 s active
position, however / labor 1 s vote in 1938 lacked the solidarity it
possessed in 1936. On the positive side for labor Senator Robert
Wagner of New York was re-elected by a large majority. The
American Labor Party polled over 400POO votes. A referendum
against unionism was defeated in California. In New York, a
11

bill of rights for labor 11 was written into the state constitution. 54

One of labor 1 s major defeats in the 1938 election was the defeat
of Governor Frank Murphy in Michigan. Murphy had been
instrumental in the success of the sit-down strikes at General
Motors in 1937 when he refused to use the National Guard. 55
The Non-Partisan League entered into the congressional elections
of 19 3 8 and tried to defeat all opponents of the New Deal and to
elect its adherents. 56 In the late 1930 1 s Sidney Hillman of the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers assumed the political leadership
of labor. Hillman's ties to the administration became strong as a
result of the Lewis-Roosevelt split in 1937.
The outbreak of World War II in 1939 turned the nation
away from many of its domestic problems. The A.F .L. and the

54 11 What Election Means t
1938), pp. 58-59.

II

New Republic t

xcvrr (November 23 t

5511 Election Sets Stage for Purge of Administration's Purgers 1
Newsweek, XII {November 21 1 1938), p. 11.
5 6 oulles, Labor In America , p. 315.

11
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bulk of the C. I. 0. membership supported Roosevelt's foreign
policy. Lewis bitterly resented Roosevelt's failure to use him as
his principal adviser. As a result, Lewis took a hostile attitude
to the President's foreign policy. Communist dominated unions
opposed Roosevelt's foreign policy and promoted complete
neutrality.

The Communists' position coincided with the Nazi-

Soviet Pact signed in August, 1939. 57
Labor's affiliation with politics carried into the 1940's. The
Poli tic al Action Committee, under Hillman' s leadership, was organ ized in the early 1940's to support candidates sympathetic to labor.
Labor' s relationship to politics was now an established precedent.
Labor' s affiliation with politics was inevitable.

The older

political symbols had more prestige than those of the labor movement. Consequently, labor had to move toward political action to
achieve its goals.

Though there were movements for a labor party

in the 19 3 0 's , labor realized the tradition of the older parties
carried weight that a new party would lack. Thus, the Democrats
were a natural carrier of labor's objectives.SB

5 7 Pelling, American Labor, pp. 171-17 2 .
58 Robert R. R. Brooks, When Labor Organizes (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1937), p. 293.
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It can hardly be doubted that Roosevelt and his advisers were

not aware of labor' s plight and labor' s large bloc of votes. The
workers and their potential political energy became more important
to Roosevelt than the political immunity of the A.F.L. executive
council. 5 9
Because of labor' s political potential a large portion of the
New Deal legislation was pro-labor. The New Deal stood for the
right of wage earners to organize and bargain collectively.
Because of the Wagner Act the government is obligated to protect labor' s rights.

Social security and unemployment compensa-

tion gives relief and security to the unemployed. The New Deal
means , above all, government intervention to remove economic
maladjustments. New Deal legislation in the 1930's or depression
decade made it possible for organized labor to realize some of its
objectives. 60

59Milton Derber and Edwin Young (ed.) / Labor and the New
Deal; (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1957), p. 181.
6 OElmer A. Benson, "The Direction is Forward," Nation,
CXLVII (December 3 1 1938}i p. 588.
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